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NOTE
Sword or Shield? The Threat of Sovereign
Immunity in Inter Partes Review
Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016-01274,
IPR2016-01275, IPR2016-01276, 2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017)

Alex Weidner*

I. INTRODUCTION
Subject to few exceptions, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
prevents states from being hailed into federal court.1 Within the context of
patent law, where all suits must be brought in federal court, states, including
state entities, entitled to sovereign immunity cannot ordinarily be sued for infringement.2 In the instant case, Covidien LP (“Covidien”) attempted to circumvent the immunity by filing an administrative challenge to Florida’s patents rather than an in-court challenge.3 However, rather than hearing the challenge, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Panel (the “panel”) dismissed the
petition after holding that sovereign immunity also applies to immunize state
actors from inter partes review challenges before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (the “Board”).4 This Note argues the panel’s decision was in error because sovereign immunity weakens the patent system by preventing patents
that fail to meet the statutory standards from being struck down, thus creating
a system in which bad patents can hold entire areas of innovation hostage.
Part II summarizes the facts and holding of Covidien LP v. University of
Florida Research Foundation Inc. Part III provides a short summary of inter
partes reviews and sovereign immunity and examines the interplay between
sovereign immunity and administrative proceedings. Part IV provides an in*

B.S. Mechanical Engineering, University of Missouri, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Layout and Design Editor, Missouri Law Review,
2018-2019. I am grateful to Professor Crouch for his insight, guidance, and support
during the writing of this Note as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the
editing process.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d
1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999); Tejas N. Narechania, Note, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical
Analysis of the “Sword” of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1574, 1574 (2010).
3. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016–01274,
IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).
4. Id.
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depth analysis of the reasoning behind the panel’s holding. Part V argues the
panel erred in holding that sovereign immunity applies to inter partes review
and that sovereign immunity is problematic for the patent system. It then suggests sovereign immunity should be deemed waived by sovereign entities in
exchange for the granting of a patent to said entities.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The University of Florida Research Foundation (“UFRF”) was founded
to assist with the research activities of the University of Florida.5 Part of its
purpose is to transfer the work product of the University of Florida staff “from
the laboratory to the public,” frequently through licensing contracts.6
UFRF exclusively licensed one of its patents to ICU AcquisitionCo Inc.
(“ICU”).7 The licensed patent covered technology for integrating bedside
physiologic sensor data and transforming it to a “machine independent format.”8 Covidien, a manufacturer and seller of global health care products, became the successor in interest to ICU.9 Covidien began paying royalties on the
sales of its Vital Sync Bedside product, previously known as iCuro.10 However, Covidien did not pay royalties on its ZephyrLIFE Hospital, ZephyrLIFE
Home, or Vital Sync VPMP products, arguing those were not covered by the
license agreement.11 Following an unsuccessful mediation,12 UFRF sued
Covidien for breach of the license in Florida state court.13 In its counterclaim,
Covidien sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.14 Covidien then
removed the suit to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida
based on the patent counterclaim,15 where UFRF successfully argued that it
5. University of Florida Research Foundation, UNIV. FLA. OFF. OF RES., http://research.ufl.edu/ufrf.html (last visited June 17, 2018).
6. Id.
7. See Non-Confidential Brief for Defendant-Appellants Medtronic PLC, Medtronic, Inc., & Covidien LP at 6, 8, Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc. v. Medtronic
PLC, No. 2016–2422, 2016 WL 5817687 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2017); Covidien LP’s
Amended Counterclaim ¶ 1, Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., v. Medtronic PLC, No.
1:16–cv–183–MW–GRJ, 2016 WL 8609049 (N.D. Fla. July 1, 2016).
8. Managing Critical Care Physiologic Data Using Data Synthesis Tech. (DST),
U.S. Patent No. 7,062,251 (filed Mar. 5, 2004) (issued June 13, 2006).
9. Covidien LP’s Amended Counterclaim, supra note 7, ¶ 1; see generally Minimally Invasive Therapies, MEDTRONIC, http://www.medtronic.com/covidien/enus/products.html (last visited June 10, 2018). As the successor in interest, Covidien
acquired the licenses that ICU possessed. Id.
10. Id. ¶ 21.
11. Id. ¶ 22.
12. Id. ¶ 4.
13. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc. v. Medtronic PLC, No. 1:16CV183MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 3869877, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016).
14. Id.
15. This removal was based on a recently enacted statute that made the counterclaim an independent basis for removal. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012) (“A civil
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was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Covidien’s counterclaim.16 Because the patent counterclaim was dismissed due to sovereign immunity, the suit was remanded to state court.17
Separate from the counterclaim for noninfringement, Covidien filed three
petitions with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”)
seeking inter partes review of the claims of the licensed patent on June 28,
2016.18 The petitions were consolidated into a single hearing where UFRF
sought, and received, permission from the Board to file a motion to dismiss the
petition based on sovereign immunity.19 In its motion, UFRF argued its status
as a state entity entitled it a sovereign immunity defense to the institution of an
inter partes review.20 The panel concluded sovereign immunity applied to such
proceedings because they were sufficiently similar to Article III proceedings.21
As a result, the petition to institute an inter partes review was dismissed.22

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part provides an overview of the legal doctrines pertinent to the instant case. Section A discusses patent law and the inter partes review process,
and Section B examines sovereign immunity and its impact on administrative
proceedings.

A. Overview of Patent Law and the Inter Partes Review Process
All patent law is built upon the foundation of Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, which provides that the purpose of the patent system is “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to

action in which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights may be removed to the district
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the
action is pending.”). The district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction of patent
related civil actions arising under an Act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
States do not have jurisdiction over these claims. Id.
16. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., 2016 WL 3869877, at *5.
17. Id. at *6.
18. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016–01274,
IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017);
see inter partes review discussion infra Section III.A.
19. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *8–11, *17. Article III proceedings occur in courts whose power is
vested in them by Article III of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Article III
courts include federal district and circuit courts as well as the United States Supreme
Court. Id. art. III, § 1.
22. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1.
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authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”23 The core patentability doctrines of patent eligibility,24 novelty,25
nonobviousness,26 and enablement 27 were built upon this foundation.28
These four patentability doctrines function as a series of gates that a patent application must pass through to be deemed worthy of patent protection.29
Should an application fail to satisfy one of the doctrines’ requirements, a patent
will not be granted.30 In fact, even issued patents may be invalidated if it is
shown they fail to meet the requirements of any of the four doctrines.31 However, for the purpose of this Note and for inter partes review, only novelty and
nonobviousness play a significant role.32 To be novel, an invention must not
be anticipated by prior art.33 An invention is anticipated “only if each and every
element” of a patent’s claims can be found “in a single prior art reference.”34
The invention must also be nonobvious.35 A determination of obviousness is
made “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the

23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S.
1, 5 (1966) (“The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.”); see generally 60
AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 1, Westlaw (database updated 2018).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
26. See id. § 103 (2012).
27. See id. § 112(a) (2012).
28. See 69 C.J.S. Patents § 16, Westlaw (database updated 2018).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
30. C.J.S., supra note 28, § 16.
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
32. See id. § 311(b) (2012).
33. Id. § 102 (2012). Prior art is defined as:
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or
in an application for patent published or deemed published under section
122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another
inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention.

Id. § 102(a).
34. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(citing Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 715 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”36
Inter partes review, which was implemented as part of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, is a means of challenging the validity of a patent at the
USPTO rather than in court.37 The inter partes review process begins when “a
person who is not the owner of a patent . . . file[s] with [the USPTO] a petition
to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”38 The “petitioner . . . may
request to cancel as unpatentable [one] or more claims of a patent only on a
ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of
prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”39
However, the proceeding “shall not be instituted for a ground of unpatentability unless the [Board] decides that the petition supporting the ground would
demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims
challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”40 If the petition is dismissed, the
decision cannot be appealed unless it would “implicate constitutional questions
. . . or . . . present other questions of interpretation that reach, in terms of scope
and impact, well beyond [the USPTO’s decision to initiate inter partes review.]”41
If an inter partes review is instituted, the process allows a response to the
petition to be filed, discovery, the filing of motions, and amendment or cancellation of patent claims, provided the patent owner does not seek to broaden
them.42 Next, “the . . . Board shall issue a final written decision with respect
to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any
new claim added under section 316(d).”43 Once the decision has been issued,

36. Id.
37. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 311, 125 Stat. 284,

299 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012)).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (italics omitted).
39. Id. § 311(b); see generally id. § 102 (2012) (novelty condition); id. § 103
(2012) (nonobviousness requirement).
40. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2016). Something is unpatentable if it fails to meet the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112, or some other statutory requirement. With
regard to inter partes review, a patent may only be invalidated due to a § 102 or § 103
deficiency.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012) (“The determination by the Director whether to
institute an inter partes review under this section hall be final and nonappealable”);
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016) (“[W]e emphasize
that our interpretation applies where the grounds for attacking the decision to institute
inter partes review consist of questions that are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statues related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes review.”).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2012). Note that once the patent has issued, the claims may
only be broadened by filing a reissue application under 35 U.S.C. § 251 within two
years of the date of issuance for the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251(d) (2012).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012). “During an inter partes review instituted under this
chapter, the patent owner may file [one] motion to amend the patent in [one] or more

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 13

892

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

the matter can be appealed.44 If no appeal is taken, or once the appeal is terminated, the director issues and publishes a certificate, which has the effect of
“canceling any claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable, confirming any claim of the patent determined to be patentable, and incorporating
in the patent by operation of the certificate any new or amended claim determined to be patentable.” 45

B. Sovereign Immunity and its Impact on Administrative Proceedings
The Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”46 This has long been construed
to mean that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment limits the judicial authority of the
federal courts and bars unconsented suit against a state.”47 While the impact
of sovereign immunity on Article III proceedings is well-established, its impact
on administrative proceedings has been frequently contested. The United
States Supreme Court has indicated that immunity applies in administrative
proceedings that are court-like – i.e., any proceeding substantially similar to an
Article III proceeding.48
The leading United States Supreme Court precedent comes from the 2002
decision of Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority.49 In Federal Maritime, a cruise ship company filed a complaint with
the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”) after repeatedly being denied permission to dock a cruise ship at the South Carolina State Ports Authority’s
(“SCSPA’s”) facilities.50 An administrative law judge initially determined that
“as an arm of the State of South Carolina, [SCSPA] was ‘entitled to sovereign
immunity.’”51 However, the FMC reversed sua sponte after determining that
“[t]he doctrine of state sovereign immunity . . . is meant to cover proceedings
before judicial tribunals, whether Federal or state, not executive branch administrative agencies like the [FMC].”52 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

of the following ways: (A) Cancel any challenged patent claim. (B) For each challenged claim, propose a reasonable number of substitute claims.” Id. § 316(d)(1)
(2012).
44. Id. § 319 (2012).
45. Id. § 318(b).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
47. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
48. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751, 761 (2002).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 747–48.
51. Id. at 749.
52. Id. at 750 (alternation in original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7,
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (No. 01-46)).
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Circuit then reversed the FMC, reestablishing immunity.53 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether sovereign immunity
applies to adjudications conducted by the FMC.54
The Court determined “[t]he preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”55 Further, “[t]he affront to a State’s dignity does not lessen
when an adjudication takes place in an administrative tribunal as opposed to an
Article III court” because “[i]n both instances, a State is required to defend
itself in an adversarial proceeding against a private party before an impartial
federal officer.”56 Additionally, because “it would be quite strange to prohibit
Congress from exercising its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Article III judicial proceedings but permit the use of those same Article I powers to create court-like administrative tribunals where sovereign immunity does not apply,”57 the Court agreed with, and affirmed, the Fourth Circuit’s decision that sovereign immunity applies to both Article III proceedings
and any other proceeding that “walks, talks, and squawks very much like a
lawsuit.”58
In Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of University of Missouri,59 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, while “a state’s participation in the
federal patent system does not of itself waive immunity in federal court with
respect to patent infringement by the state,” the University of Missouri waived
its immunity by initiating and participating fully in an interference proceeding.60 In Vas-Cath, the University of Missouri copied nineteen of Vas-Cath’s
claims to initiate an interference proceeding – a proceeding conducted by the
USPTO “for the purpose of determining priority of invention as between competing applicants for patent on the same invention.”61 The University of Missouri was awarded priority by the USPTO, and Vas-Cath appealed the decision
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.62 The University of
Missouri transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Missouri and asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court, causing the case to be dismissed.63 Vas-Cath appealed the dismissal to
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 760 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
Id. at 760–61.
Id. at 761 (citation omitted).
Id. at 751 (quoting S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 243 F.3d 165,
174 (4th Cir. 2001)).
59. 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
60. Id. at 1381, 1385.
61. Id. at 1378–79; see generally MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
§ 2303 (9th ed.) (providing a more in-depth explanation of interference proceedings).
62. Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379.
63. Id. at 1379–80. The case was transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),
which states that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue
in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 13

894

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

the Federal Circuit, arguing the University of Missouri waived its immunity by
participating in, and benefiting from, the interference proceeding.64
The Federal Circuit agreed with the waiver argument, stating, “[T]he University cannot both retain the fruits of [the interference proceeding] and bar the
losing party from its statutory right of review, even if that review is conducted
in federal court.”65 Acknowledging the holding in Federal Maritime, the Federal Circuit stated that “[l]ike proceedings in the [FMC], contested interference
proceedings in the [US]PTO bear ‘strong similarities’ to civil litigation . . . and
the administrative proceeding can indeed be characterized as a lawsuit” because “[US]PTO interferences involve adverse parties, examination and crossexamination by deposition of witnesses, production of documentary evidence,
findings by an impartial federal adjudicator, and power to implement the decision.”66 However, the Federal Circuit concluded that “when the University
initiated and participated in the interference, its participation included the ensuing statutory review procedures,” and therefore the University of Missouri
could not use the Eleventh Amendment to prevent the agency decision from
review by a federal court.67
The United States Supreme Court also addressed the issue of waiver in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank,68 holding the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (the “TRCA”) did
not abrogate Florida’s sovereign immunity.69 In College Savings, College Savings Bank (“CSB”) sued Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board (“FPPEE”) for violating section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by making
misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports.70 FPPEE asserted its sovereign immunity, arguing the TRCA did not

such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a) (2012); see also Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379.
64. Id. at 1380.
65. Id. at 1385.
66. Id. at 1382 (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)).
67. Id. at 1384.
68. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
69. Id. at 691.
70. Id. at 670–71. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which –
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss3/13

8

Weidner: Sword or Shield? The Threat of Sovereign Immunity in Inter Partes

2018]

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN INTER PARTES REVIEW

895

abrogate its immunity.71 Both the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,72 and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether [section 43(a) of the Lanham Act] is effective to permit suit
against a State for its alleged misrepresentation of its own product –
either because the TRCA effects a constitutionally permissible abrogation of state sovereign immunity, or because the TRCA operates as an
invitation to waiver of such immunity which is automatically accepted
by a State’s engaging in the activities regulated by the Lanham Act. 73

The Court emphasized the importance of sovereign immunity, noting,
“[S]overeign immunity is ‘a personal privilege which [a state] may waive at
pleasure,’”74 and “the decision to waive that immunity . . . ‘is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty.’”75 The Court continued, declaring “a
State may, absent any contractual commitment to the contrary, alter the conditions of its waiver and apply those changes to a pending suit.”76 Because there
was no property right in freedom from a competitor’s false advertising, the
Court found the TRCA did not create a constitutionally permissible abrogation
under the Fourteenth Amendment.77 Similarly, the Court found no waiver because FPPEE did not expressly consent to being sued in federal court and because there was little distinction between Congress’ attempt at removing sovereign immunity via participation in interstate commerce and simply abrogating the immunity.78

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
71. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 671.
72. Id. at 672; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’g, 948 F. Supp. 400, 428 (D.N.J. 1996).
73. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 669.
74. Id. at 675 (quoting Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 463, 447 (1883)).
75. Id. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857)).
76. Id. at 676 (emphasis added). The court provided an example of such a situation
by citing Petty v. Tennessee–Missouri Bridge Commission, where a suability provision
attached to the congressional approval of an interstate compact was sufficient to constitute a constructive waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 686; see Petty v. Tenn.–Mo.
Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
77. Id. at 673–74; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment predominantly deals with “equal protection” and “due process of law.” See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676, 683–84.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The panel dismissed Covidien’s petitions because it determined that “Patent Owner UFRF, as an arm of the State of Florida, [was] entitled to a sovereign immunity defense to the institution of an inter partes review of the challenged patent.”79 The panel first examined sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings by looking to the Eleventh Amendment as well as the Federal
Maritime and Vas-Cath decisions.80 The panel then considered whether the
Federal Maritime decision applied to inter partes review proceedings, and if
so, how it applies to them.81 Finally, the panel addressed the issue of whether
UFRF was an arm of the State of Florida.82
The panel first concluded the Federal Maritime decision applied to inter
partes review.83 In coming to this conclusion, the panel examined the nature
of an inter partes proceeding and compared it to the proceeding in Federal
Maritime.84 The panel observed “that the term inter partes means between the
parties, which in itself captures the notion that the proceeding is directed to
both parties over whom the Board exercises jurisdiction.”85 Additionally, the
panel noted that “[t]he statutes and rules governing inter partes reviews are
consistent with this view.”86 The panel cited § 42.105 of title 37 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, which requires a petition and evidence to be served on
the patent owner, and § 42.106 of title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
which states the petition will not be accorded a filing date until the petition
satisfies a list of requirements, including service on the correspondence address
provided in § 42.105(a) of title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.87 In
addition, “[a] petition to institute an inter partes review must identify ‘each
claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based,

79. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016–01274,
IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017)
(italics omitted).
80. Id. at *2; see Eleventh Amendment, Federal Marine, and Vas-Cath discussions supra Section III.B and accompanying notes.
81. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *3, *5–11.
82. Id. at *12–17.
83. Id. at *12.
84. Id. at *9–11 (discussing the similarities between civil litigation and inter partes
reviews).
85. Id. at *6 (italics omitted).
86. Id. (italics omitted).
87. Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 42.105 (2016) (“In addition to the requirements of § 42.6, the
petitioner must serve the petition and exhibits relied upon in the petition.”); 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.106(a) (2016) (italics omitted) (“A petition to institute inter partes review will not
be accorded a filing date until the petition satisfies all of the following requirements:
(1) Complies with § 42.104; (2) Effects service of the petition on the correspondence
address of record as provided in § 42.105(a); and (3) Is accompanied by the fee to
institute required in § 42.15(a).”).
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and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”88
The patent owner may respond to the petition, and the USPTO must decide
whether to institute an inter partes review within three months.89 The USPTO
may not institute such a review unless there is a “reasonable likelihood” at least
one of the claims is likely unpatentable.90 Finally, the panel stated, “the
Board’s role in the inter partes review is not unlike that of the Commission in
FMC, which is to assess the merits of the arguments presented by the parties
in an impartial manner.”91 Because inter partes proceedings closely resemble
the proceeding in the Federal Maritime decision, the panel determined the Federal Maritime analysis should be applied to inter partes reviews.92
After determining the proceeding in Federal Maritime was sufficiently
similar to inter partes review, the panel applied Federal Maritime’s analysis to
determine whether sovereign immunity applied to inter partes review.93 This
involved comparing inter partes reviews to civil suits to determine if the two
were similar enough for sovereign immunity to apply in inter partes reviews.94
The panel found that “inter partes reviews are adversarial ‘contested cases between a patent owner and a petitioner in which the petitioner bears the burden
of proof and initiates the proceedings by filing a petition requesting the institut[ion of] a trial.’”95 It also discussed the patent owner’s argument that inter
partes reviews are “held before panels of three impartial administrative patent
judges . . . , immune from political influence, who serve a role functionally
comparable to that of an Article III judge.”96
The parties are also allowed to engage in motion practice similar to that
of a civil suit.97 Even the discovery “procedures of an inter partes review are
similar . . . to those in federal court litigation” because
[t]he parties are entitled to “routine discovery” that includes production
of “any exhibit cited in a paper or in testimony must be served with the
citing paper or testimony,” cross-examination of affidavit testimony
prepared for the proceeding, and “information that is inconsistent with
a position advanced by the party during the proceeding concurrent with
the filing of the documents or things that contain the inconsistency.” 98

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *7 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012)).
Id.; see 35 U.S.C. §314(b) (2012).
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *7 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012)).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at *8.
Id. at *8–12.
See id. at 8.
Id. at *8–9 (alteration in original) (italics omitted) (quoting Patent Owner’s
Motion to Dismiss at 9, Covidien LP v. Uni. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos.
IPR2016–01274, IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 14, 2016)).
96. Id. at *8 (citing Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 95, at 8–9).
97. Id. at *8.
98. Id. at *10 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 (1)(i)-(iii) (2016)).
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The panel analyzed whether UFRF had waived its immunity in a manner
similar to the University of Missouri in Vas-Cath and determined that UFRF
had not taken any action sufficient to constitute waiver.99 Because of the overwhelming similarities between inter partes review and civil suits, the panel
concluded “that the considerable resemblance between the two is sufficient to
implicate the immunity afforded to the States by the Eleventh Amendment,”
and therefore, “Eleventh Amendment immunity bars the institution of an inter
partes review against an unconsenting state that has not waived sovereign immunity.”100
Finally, the panel examined whether UFRF was an arm of the State of
Florida and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity.101 The panel looked to
the following factors in making its determination: “(1) how state law defines
the entity; (2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity; (3)
where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments
against the entity.”102 Addressing the first factor, the panel concluded UFRF’s
“statutory origin” and direct support organization (“DSO”) status “weigh[ed]
in favor” of finding UFRF to be an arm of Florida.103 For the second factor,

99. Compare id. at *12 (initiating an inter partes review), with Vas-Cath, Inc. v.
Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 743 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (initiating and
participating in an interference).
100. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11–12 (italics omitted).
101. See id. at *12–17.
102. Id. at *12 (citing Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (en
banc)).
103. Id. at *13. In support of this finding, the panel referenced the University of
Florida Financial report. Id. at *12. The relevant portion stated:
[T]he University’s direct-support organizations, as provided for in Section
1004.28, Florida Statutes, and Board of Governors Regulation 9.011, are considered component units of the University of Florida and therefore the latest
audited financial statements of these organizations are discretely presented in
the financial statements of the University. These legally separate, not-for-profit
corporations are organized and operated exclusively to assist the University to
achieve excellence by providing supplemental resources from private gifts and
bequests, and valuable education support services. The Statute authorizes these
organizations to receive, hold, invest, and administer property and to make expenditures to or for the benefit of the University.

Id. at *13. In conjunction with the report, the panel cited a Florida statute that defines
“University direct-support organization” as:
1. A Florida corporation not for profit incorporated under the provisions of
chapter 617 and approved by the Department of State.
2. Organized and operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and administer
property and to make expenditures to or for the benefit of a state university in
Florida or for the benefit of a research and development park or research and
development authority affiliated with a state university and organized under
part V of chapter 159.
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the panel relied on two of the district court’s findings.104 First, “the Board of
Trustees for the University of Florida prescribes the conditions with which
UFRF must comply in order to use property, facilities, or personal services at
any state university.”105 Second, UFRF’s bylaws require its budget to be approved by the president of the university.106 Those two combined findings
were used by the panel to conclude the State had a high degree of control over
UFRF.107 For the third factor, the panel found that UFRF received its funding
through the university because the financial report stated the university considered UFRF’s assets and liabilities to be its own.108 Finally, the panel concluded
the State’s laws controlling UFRF’s ability to issue debt evidenced a “considerable degree of control” over UFRF.109 Since each of the four factors weighed
in UFRF’s favor, the panel concluded UFRF was entitled to sovereign immunity.110
Because the panel determined sovereign immunity could be asserted in
an inter partes review and because the UFRF was deemed an arm of the State
of Florida that had not waived its sovereign immunity, the proceedings were
dismissed.111

V. COMMENT
This Part argues that the panel erred in holding sovereign immunity applied to inter partes review. Section A argues that, as a matter of policy, shielding patents from challenge goes against the very purpose of the patent system.
Section B suggests sovereign entities should be deemed to have waived their
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in all proceedings involving their
patents, especially in situations where the patentee has engaged in licensing or
other market activity involving the patent.

3. An organization that a state university board of trustees, after review, has
certified to be operating in a manner consistent with the goals of the university
and in the best interest of the state. Any organization that is denied certification
by the board of trustees shall not use the name of the university that it serves.

Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Fla. STAT. § 1004.28 (1)(a)(1)–(3) (2014)).
104. Id. (citing Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Medtronic, No. 1:16CV183MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 3869877, at *2–3 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016)).
105. Id. (citing Univ. of Florida Research Found. Inc., 2016 WL 3869877, at *2).
106. Id.
107. Id. at *15.
108. Id. at *15–16.
109. Id. at *16.
110. Id. at *17.
111. Id.
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A. Sovereign Immunity is Problematic for Reasons of Policy
The decision in Covidien is troubling for several reasons. First, because
the panel decided whether to institute an inter partes review based on
Covidien’s petition, the decision may not be appealable.112 By holding that
sovereign immunity applied to inter partes review, the panel fundamentally altered the patent system.113 An unreviewable change of such magnitude made
by a trio of administrative patent judges, rather than the legislature, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or the Supreme Court of the United
States, is deeply concerning because it ignores well-established methods of
creating and construing law.
The decision is also troubling as a matter of policy. The stringent requirements a patent must meet, both during and after prosecution, are designed to
ensure only those patents that truly deserve protection receive it.114 Sovereign
immunity does not affect the examination or reexamination of patents, but, as
seen in Covidien, it blocks the patent from being challenged by lawsuit or inter
partes review.115 By sheltering patents owned by sovereign entities, those who
would file a petition for inter partes review are prevented from invalidating
patents that fail to meet the statutory requirements.116 In essence, sovereign
immunity is a means of protecting “bad” patents from scrutiny. This is a major
issue because a single patent can control an entire field of innovation.117
112. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012) (“The determination by the Director whether to
institute an inter partes review . . . shall be final and nonappealable.”); Cuozzo Speed
Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016) (italics omitted) (“Congress has told
the Patent Office to determine whether inter partes review should proceed, and it has
made the agency’s decision ‘final’ and ‘nonappealable.’ Our conclusion that courts
may not revisit this initial determination gives effect to this statutory command.”) (alteration in original).
113. See Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *12.
114. See discussion of patentability requirements discussion supra Section III.A.
115. Covidien, 2017 WL4015009, at *2, *17.
116. While the patent prosecution process is designed to weed out bad applications,
time constraints on examiners can often lead to the issuance of patents that should have
been rejected. See Mark A. Lemley, Fixing the Patent Office, STAN. INST. ECON. POL’Y
RES. 6–7 (2012), https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/11014_0.pdf. This, in part, leads to the creation of post-grant review, reexamination, and
reissue; C. Gregory Gramenopoulos & Elliot C. Cook, Divine Intervention: Intervening
Rights Based on Post-Grant Examination, Before and After Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), CHARTERED INST. PATENT ATT’YS J. (June 2012), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/divine-intervention-intervening-rights-based-on-post-grant.html.
The ability to invalidate a patent by suit also helps eliminate patents that slipped
through the cracks during the examination process. Lemley, supra, at 13.
117. See generally Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Patents in Renewable
Energy Technology Innovation, GLOBAL CC INST. (June 1, 2013), https://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/intellectual-property-rights-role-patents-renewable-energy-technology-innovation/1-how-patents-encourage-innovation-technological-development-and-deployment.
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For example, imagine if a sovereign entity had owned the Wright brothers’ patent, and assume the patent was a “bad” one that could have been invalidated if not for sovereign immunity. In this situation, nearly all progress in
the field of aeronautics would have been halted for the life of the patent. If not
for the sovereign entity, another inventor could have challenged the “bad” patent and had it invalidated. In fact, if a non-sovereign entity had owned the
patent, then that is precisely what would have occurred. This hypothetical
highlights the threat sovereign immunity poses to both innovation and the U.S.
patent system. If a bad patent is allowed to survive, especially if it controls an
entire field of innovation, sheltering that patent harms the public interest of
innovation and corporate interests of economic growth.
Additionally, governmental entities that hold such patents typically license them to outside companies.118 Because the government will retain ownership of the patent, licensing allows a corporation to use the patent without
fear of having it invalidated. This is an unfair market advantage when compared with companies that develop their own technology and own the patent
themselves. For example, if it is assumed Company A leases a patent from a
sovereign entity that could be invalidated while Company B owns a similar
patent, then Company A will be safe to continue using the patent, and Company
B will have its patent invalidated. By creating multiple means of challenging
bad patents, Congress and the USPTO implicitly encourage invalidation of patents that cannot withstand scrutiny.119 Protecting those patents that cannot
stand on their own decreases the strength of, and breeds distrust in, the entire
patent system.
This issue will only grow more prevalent as universities and other academic institutions become more heavily involved in research. In 1985, 594
utility patents were issued to academic institutions.120 By 2012, that number
had risen to 4797 utility patents.121 Similarly, since the Florida Prepaid and
College Savings decisions, patent applications filed by public universities have
increased by twenty-four percent per million dollars spent, and filings from
private universities have increased by thirty-four percent per million dollars
spent.122 Even more dramatic has been the increase in licensing since the two
decisions.123 The average number of active patent licenses for public universities has increased by over fifty-five percent, and the average number of private
school active patent licenses has increased by forty percent.124 This trend is
118. See, e.g., Narechania, supra note 2, at 1612; see also Licensing, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., https://www.ars.usda.gov/office-of-technology-transfer/licensing/ (last visited
June 20, 2018).
119. See discussion regarding challenging patents supra Section III.A.
120. See U.S. College and Universities – Utility Patent Grants 1969–2012, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/doc/doc_info_2012.htm (last
visited June 20, 2018).
121. Id.
122. Narechania, supra note 2, at 1958 tbl.4, tbl.5.
123. See id. at 1601 tbl.8.
124. Id.
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likely to continue, increasing the number of unduly sheltered patents while
simultaneously restricting innovation in countless fields. Further, the panel’s
decision is not restricted to academic institutions.125 As a result, other state
government institutions that hold patents may exacerbate this problem should
they seek to exploit sovereign immunity and prevent their patents from being
challenged.

B. Sovereign Immunity Should Be Deemed Waived in Patent Proceedings
This Section proposes that any patent grant should incorporate a waiver
of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity poses a
significant problem to both inter partes review and the overall patent process.
However, both problems can be solved by incorporating a waiver of Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity into the patent contract between the USPTO
and the applicant. This solution is not only synergistic with early patent law,
but it also avoids the fact Congress itself cannot unilaterally abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity without constitutional amendment.126
To solve the issue with abrogating state sovereign immunity via legislation, it is helpful to examine similar issues that have arisen in the past. It appears early English patents were issued with a clause authorizing revocation if
“it turns out [the patent] was improperly issued or bec[ame] ‘prejudicial or inconvenient.’”127 Next, it is useful to look at more modern sources to see if they
provide assistance in devising a solution. In her article entitled Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private Contract, and Federal
Incentives, Christina Bohannan128 examined, in light of the holding in College
Savings, that there were three situations where a state would be considered to
125. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 632 n.3, 647–48 (1999) (finding a state and its arms are protected by the
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
126. See id. at 647–48 (holding that Congress does not have authority to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to patent infringement by the states).
127. Dennis Crouch, Correction: Bracha Was Exactly Correct About the Privy
Council Exception, PATENTLYO (August 23, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/08/correction-exactly-exception.html [hereinafter Correction].
128. Christina Bohannan is a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law
who specializes in intellectual property, First Amendment, and competition law.
Christina Bohannan, UNIV. IOWA C.L., https://law.uiowa.edu/christina-bohannan (last
visited June 20, 2018). She has published many works dealing with patents and intellectual property, one of which was cited favorably by the United States Supreme
Court in the landmark patent case Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. Christina Bohannan–CV, UNIV. IOWA C.L.,
https://law.uiowa.edu/sites/law.uiowa.edu/files/bohannan.pdf (last visited June 20,
2018); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
86, 92 (2012).
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have waived its immunity: (1) by failing to assert immunity as a defense, (2)
“by agree[ing] in a private contract,” and (3) by accepting federal funds that
were conditioned upon waiving immunity.129 With regard to contractual waivers, she concluded that courts should enforce voluntary waivers of immunity
and prevent states from reconsidering their waiver when sued.130
Patents are most often thought of as a form of intellectual property, but
they are also considered a form of contract.131 While the terms of a patent “do
not themselves explicitly recite the terms of a contract between the sovereign
and the patentee, such is implicit from the provisions of the patent statute.”132
Because a patent can be deemed a type of contract, the terms of the contract
between the applicant and the USPTO can theoretically be negotiated. In fact,
the current patenting system already involves an exchange of consideration between the two parties.133 In return for a limited monopoly over the invention,134
the applicant must satisfactorily disclose the invention to the public and allow
it to enter the public domain once the patent expires.135
The fact that patents have been deemed a form of contract is significant
because it allows for the waiver of sovereign immunity. While Congress is
prevented from explicitly abrogating the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the states via legislation,136 there is nothing preventing Congress or
the USPTO from altering the patent contract between the USPTO and the patentee. In fact, the United States Supreme Court explicitly said as much in
College Savings by noting that “a State may, absent any contractual commitment to the contrary, alter the conditions of its waiver and apply those changes
to a pending suit.”137 As a result, it would be possible to amend the terms of
the contract between the USPTO and the patentee to add the requirement that
sovereign entities who choose to obtain patents must waive their immunity in
all proceedings involving those patents.138 The proposed waiver would apply
even to those patents issued to a third party but later transferred to a sovereign
entity. Adding this requirement would avoid the issue of abrogating immunity
via legislation because the waiver would be contractual and voluntary. If the
governmental applicant did not consent to waiving its immunity, it would still

129. Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 273, 277 (2002)
(emphasis added).
130. Id. at 303.
131. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:2 (2d
ed. 2018).
132. Id. (citing Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 242 (1832)).
133. Id.
134. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
135. MILLS ET AL., supra note 131; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
136. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 666, 691 (1999).
137. Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
138. See id.
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be free to forego attaining a patent and attempt to keep its invention as a trade
secret instead.
This change would be similar to early English patents in the sense that
part of the patent agreement would involve a clause permitting a challenge to
the patent.139 Like the clause used in early English patents allowing the King
and Privy Council to invalidate a patent,140 adding the requirement that all entities waive any sovereign immunity in claims regarding their patent would
prevent patents from being immune to challenge. Further, the existence of a
basis in American and English law141 for such an argument to be made indicates that the solution may be effective.
The proposed solution would also address other issues caused by sovereign immunity. For example, a problem currently exists involving corporations
using the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes to shield the corporations’ patents from review.142 Allergan, a global pharmaceutical company, “transferred
title to all of its Restasis patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe” in an attempt
to immunize its patents, some of which were already being challenged before
the Board, from inter partes review.143 The decision to transfer title to its patents was based in part upon universities, such as UFRF, having been quite
successful fending off “both [inter partes review] and declaratory judgments
lawsuits – even when the patents are exclusively licensed to commercial entities.”144
The response to Allergan’s decision to transfer title to the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe and thereby utilize the tribe’s sovereign immunity to protect the
patents has been swift.145 Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill introduced Senate Bill 1948, titled, “A bill to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes
as a defense in inter partes review of patents.”146 The text of the bill is as
follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an Indian tribe may not
assert sovereign immunity as a defense in a review that is conducted under
139. See Correction, supra note 127. It should be noted that early English patents
functioned quite differently from the modern patent. With regard to invalidation by the
Privy Council, however, the inter partes review process is similar in that both involve
a tribunal invalidating a patent post-issue because the patent was improperly issued.
This similarity allows for useful comparisons on the issue of waiver despite the vast
differences between the early English and modern American patent systems.
140. See id.
141. See id.; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676.
142. See Dennis Crouch, Allergan: Creating Sovereign Immunity with Tribal PassThrough, PATENTLYO (September 8, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/09/allergan-creating-sovereign.html [hereinafter Allergan].
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Dennis Crouch, A Bill to Abrogate the Sovereign Immunity of Indian
Tribes as a Defense in Inter Partes Review of Patents, PATENTLYO (October 6, 2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/10/abrogate-sovereign-immunity.html [hereinafter
A Bill].
146. Id. (italics omitted).
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chapter 31 of title 35, United States Code.”147 This quick response indicates
that at least a portion of Congress thinks that allowing corporations to utilize
the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes to immunize their patents from inter
partes review poses a significant threat to the patent system.
A governmental entity, such as a university, utilizing its state’s sovereign
immunity is no different from Allergan’s use of the Indian tribe’s sovereign
immunity and is equally problematic. Unfortunately, because the United States
Supreme Court has held Congress cannot abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, the instant problem cannot be addressed in the same way.148 Nevertheless, the basic idea of disallowing sovereign immunity in inter partes proceedings can be used to craft a potential solution.
The proposed change would also be similar to the bill introduced by Senator McCaskill. It would effectively prevent the use of sovereign immunity by
any party, including Indian tribes, in inter partes review or other patent proceedings.149 In fact, it would solve the Indian tribe issue without the need to
pass legislation specifically targeting native tribes’ sovereign immunity in inter
partes review.150 It would also be an evenhanded solution because it would
target companies, like Allergan, that seek to utilize the sovereign immunity of
Indian tribes151 and governmental organizations asserting state immunity
equally.152
The proposed solution also fits the intent of the patentability,153 nov154
elty, nonobviousness,155 and enablement statutes.156 These statutes are designed to ensure patents are held to a certain standard; preventing sovereign
immunity from applying in any patent proceeding would ensure that all patents,
regardless of the entity that owns them, could be challenged on the basis of
failure to meet this standard. This furthers the goal of allowing only good patents to be entitled to protection.

147. A Bill to Abrogate the Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes as a Defense in
Inter Partes Review of Patents, S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017); see also A Bill, supra note
145.
148. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016–01274,
IPR2016–0127, IPR2016–01275, IPR2016–01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *3 (P.T.A.B.
Jan. 25, 2017) (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760–
61 (2002)).
149. See A Bill, supra note 145.
150. See id.
151. See generally Allergan, supra note 142.
152. See, e.g., Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009.
153. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
154. Id. § 102 (2012).
155. Id. § 103 (2012).
156. Id. § 112 (2012).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 13

906

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

VI. CONCLUSION
In Covidien, the panel held that sovereign immunity applies to inter partes
proceedings.157 This decision was not only an unreviewable one that fundamentally altered patent law but was also problematic for policy reasons.158 Allowing government entities, such as universities, to assert sovereign immunity
in the patent context creates an uneven playing field where bad patents are
made unchallengeable. This allows the universities, and those corporations
that license their inventions, to infringe upon others’ patents or hold an area of
innovation hostage even when their patent would otherwise be voided for failure to meet one of the statutory requirements of a patent. Such action stunts
innovation, hurts businesses by preventing research into lucrative fields, and
breeds distrust in the patent system.
However, the problem created by the Covidien decision can be rectified.
By requiring every applicant to elect to waive any rights it may possess to sovereign immunity prior to granting a patent, all patents would be subject to challenge on their merits. Such a solution would have the effect of improving or
maintaining the current quality of patents and ensuring innovation is not halted
by the invincibility of a keystone patent. The solution accords with early English patents159 and current U.S. patent law;160 it also addresses the secondary
issue of use of an Indian tribe’s sovereign immunity by corporations.161 While
the panel’s decision may be unreviewable,162 it is not too late for the USPTO
to address the significant threat that sovereign immunity poses to the public, to
corporations, and to the patent system by altering the contractual terms of a
patent grant to require waiver of sovereign immunity.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11.
See discussion supra Section V.A.
See Correction, supra note 127.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012).
See A Bill, supra note 145.
See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012).
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